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I. Introduction 
It is well known that government consumption in emerging countries is 
typically procyclical and Latin America is no exception to this trend.  Figure 1 
shows the correlation between the cyclical component of government 
expenditure and GDP5 which is, in general, positive. The contrast between 
developing and emerging countries with that of OECD countries (indicated by 
a darker bar) for which procyclicality is much smaller, is particularly striking.  
The fact that government spending is procyclical precludes the stabilizing 
role that fiscal policy should play in macroeconomic management. Even 
though neoclassical tax smoothing, Keynesian or new growth theory would all 
argue on the benefits of a countercyclical fiscal result for many countries the 
procyclicality of fiscal expenditures is so strong that it implies that fiscal 
results actually deteriorate with expansions. Notice that this requires fiscal 
expenditure to grow above and beyond the natural increase in tax revenues 
during an expansion (and to fall even more than revenues during a 
contraction). Figure 2 shows the procyclicality of fiscal results, by showing the 
correlation over the last thirty years in fiscal results and the cyclical 
component of GDP6. Again, the fact that fiscal results deteriorate when 
economic conditions improve seems to be an almost exclusive feature of 
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developing and emerging economies, whereas OECD countries show the 
expected procyclical result.  
While this has obvious implications in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilization it also may have a detrimental effect on growth. There is an ample 
literature suggesting that more economic instability is associated to slower 
growth,7 thus, the procyclicality of government expenditure and fiscal results 
not only worsens the cyclical behavior of the economy but also hurts its 
growth potential. More recently Aghion and Marinescu (2006) have made the 
point that a countercyclical fiscal policy is essential for growth because R&D 
expenditures are the first to be cut in a recession.8
While there is an extensive literature on the procyclicality of fiscal policy at 
large, including its effect on macro stabilization and growth, one aspect that 
has been relatively less studied is the connection between so called “vertical 
imbalances” in fiscal policy across different levels of government9 and its 
effect on the overall procyclicality of fiscal policies.  
The conventional wisdom story goes something like this: because 
subnational authorities are subject to some degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
(they spend resources collected by the national authority), they have little 
incentives to collect taxes (both national and local), have an incentive to 
increase spending above socially optimal levels, to run high and unsustainable 
deficits and to have an excessively procyclical fiscal behavior. At an anecdotal 
level, this view seems to be confirmed. In the cases of Brazil and Argentina, to 
take two countries that constitute the focus of this work, there are several 
examples of how subnational governments worsened the overall fiscal picture. 
In Brazil, the default of the state of Minas Gerais in early 1999 prompted  the 
sharp devaluation of the real, and in Argentina, the fiscal behavior of the 
provinces were a key ingredient in the process of fiscal deterioration that led to 
the crisis in late 2001 that forced the collapse of Convertibility. This 
conventional wisdom has been the basis on which international financial 
institutions have supported their demands for clearer and more precise fiscal 
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rules governing the relationship between the different levels of government, as 
well as in stressing the need to reduce the degree of vertical imbalances.  
This paper attempts to provide a fresh look at the conceptual issues and the 
evidence governing the relationship between procyclicality and fiscal 
federalism. In Section II we discuss the reasons why government spending is 
procyclical and why these effects may get compounded when taking into 
account the existence of subnational units. Section III, describes the specific 
relation between different levels of governments for the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil. As there are ample references describing fiscal institutions in both 
countries we present only a barebones sketch here. Both these sections can be 
skipped by readers familiar with the literature and with the cases of Argentina 
and Brazil. Section IV, the core of the paper, provides evidence on the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy in Argentina and Brazil. We explore both a time 
series as well as a cross section dimension (how procyclicality changes across 
jurisdictions) at the local level. The richness of a cross section allows to test 
for the sources of procyclicality by exploiting the information contained in the 
different observed levels of procyclicality observed across subnational 
jurisdictions. We argue that procyclicality is mostly related to the nature of the 
local tax base of subnational jurisdictions rather than related to fiscal 
federalism. Section V concludes by arguing that the focus on changing fiscal 
sharing rules has been misguided. The attention should be placed in 
developing  better financial institutions that may allow for smoothing of fiscal 
variables across the business cycle with the resources collected by each 
jurisdiction, as well as potentially designing less procyclical revenue sources.  
 
II. Why is spending procyclical?  
Traditional macroeconomic theory suggests that fiscal results should be 
countercyclical. On the one hand neoclassical theory argues that spending and 
tax rates should be determined on the basis of efficiency considerations, and 
therefore mostly unrelated to the business cycle. Furthermore, the theory 
shows that to minimize the distortions of taxation tax rates should be either 
maintained constant over time, or, if anything, reduced during a recession. 
This delivers the result that tax revenues should increase during expansions 
and fall during recessions. With a relatively stable expenditure policy, this 
implies that governments should run deficits in recessions and surpluses 
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during an expansion.10 For different reasons, the Keynesian framework 
delivers the same recommendation. According to this view, fiscal policy 
should counteract business cycle fluctuations, increasing expenditures and 
reducing taxes during recessions. Again the government should run deficits 
during recessions and surpluses during booms.  
More recently Aghion and Marinescu (2006) have argued that procyclical 
fiscal policy has detrimental effects on growth because firms curtail R&D 
expenditures during recessions. Thus, exacerbating the business cycle with 
fiscal policy reduces the level of R&D investment and reduces growth.  
The evidence suggests that developed economies mostly fit the 
recommendations of theoretical models.11 Figures 1 and 2 provided some 
cursory evidence. Talvi and Vegh (2000) also show that tax collection 
increases during an expansion and fall during recessions, and that government 
spending is countercyclical in G-7 countries and while procyclical, less so than 
tax revenues, for other industrialized countries. Gavin et al (1996) show that 
fiscal surpluses are procyclical in OECD countries, also confirming these 
countries fit the theory.  Arreaza et al (1999) finds a similar result.  
The pattern, however, does not fit emerging countries at large and Latin 
America in particular. In Latin American countries tax collection is strongly 
procyclical, but this comes together with extremely procyclical government 
expenditure, thus rendering budget results that either show no relation with the 
budget cycle as shown in Gavin et al (1996) or Talvi and Vegh (2000) or are 
countercyclical as shown in Figure 2.  
There are several explanations why fiscal expenditure may be so 
procyclical. Gavin et al (1996) suggest that the procyclicality arises from 
limited access to capital markets during downturns, thus forcing the 
government to contract expenditures when it needs them most. This 
interpretation seems to find some support in the fact that spending appears to 
be much more procyclical during recessions than during booms.  
While there is ample evidence on the procyclicality of capital flows12, the 
capital market channel does not require that governments be totally cut off 
from capital markets. Assume two types of government: a defaulting type and 
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a non defaulting type, and assume also that investors do not know the type of 
the government in power. When conditions in capital market tighten, a 
government that is the non-defaulting type is hard pressed to show to the 
investor community its commitment to fulfill its obligations. Thus, it follows 
excessively contractionary policies to signal its type at a time in which they 
most need to be expansionary.13  
Alternatively, Talvi and Vegh (2000) argue that fiscal policies are 
procyclical because weak governments cannot face the political pressures to 
increase spending when in a boom, i.e. when tax collection is on the rise or the 
economy benefits from an improvement in its terms of trade. Therefore, 
governments increase expenditures and reduce taxation in order to fend off 
such pressure, which delivers the result that both tax and expenditure policies 
become procyclical. The strong increase in fiscal demands during expansions 
can be rationalized by the so called “voracity effect” proposed by Lane and 
Tornell. According to their interpretation, if a group does not increase its 
appropriation during a boom, other groups will.  Lane and Tornell show that 
there is a strong incentive to grab part of the newly available resources before 
other groups do, and that the incentives to do so increase with the size of the 
pie; thus, this common pool problem becomes stronger in an expansion 
delivering the procyclical result. 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) place the responsibility of 
procyclicality in the equilibrium resulting in a political game between 
politically opposed governments. According to them a government may run up 
debt levels (if capital flows are procyclical this financing is available during 
booms) in order to constraint the spending policies of future governments (the 
Reagan tax cut, for example, can be interpreted as a way to condition the 
spending ability of future governments). If so, countries may build up debt 
during boom periods, thus generating a procyclical fiscal policy. 
How does fiscal federalism affect the procyclicality of government 
expenditures? To explore this we can go back to the explanations of 
procyclicality and see how they apply to subnational institutions. For example, 
the credit crunch hypothesis implies that subnational governments should be 
more procyclical than that of the national government under the (reasonable) 
assumption that their access to credit becomes even more difficult under credit 
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constraint circumstances14. However, this story cuts both ways: if a 
subnational government has very limited amount of debt because it never had 
any access to financing, domestic or international, then they should exhibit a 
lower degree of procyclicality than the national government. Below we will 
test this by looking at the effect of provincial indebtedness on procyclicality.  
The fiscal voracity effect is probably at work also in the case of subnational 
governments, usually suspected of being subject to a higher degree of 
cronyism and corruption than the national government, this effect can be 
related to the procyclicality of provincial taxes (more volatility more 
procyclicality). We test below if the procyclicality of government spending 
relates to that of provincial income.  
How does the existence of bailouts and discretionary transfers affect the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy at the national and subnational level? If 
discretionary transfers operate as an insurance mechanism over the business 
cycle, then these transfers will reduce the procyclicality of subnational 
government resources. Nicolini et al (2000) provide evidence that to some 
extent this is the case and the recent restructuring of provincial debt in 
Argentina, after the 2001 crisis is another example. However, if transfers are 
also subject to typical fiscal voracity effects, this time with subnational 
governments themselves preying the pool of national resources, their existence 
will exacerbate the procyclicality of expenditures. How could we test for this 
channel? To the extent that bailouts are usually related either to strong political 
links and that it is more costly to allow larger jurisdictions to fail, we can test 
the relevance of this explanation by relating the degree of procyclicality to the 
size of the jurisdiction (larger size should imply more procyclicality) as well as 
to the links between the governors and the national power (with stronger links 
potentially correlated with more procyclicality). If it is possible to free ride on 
the opening of capital markets for the national government, then subnational 
units will try to appropriate resources from the federal government when this 
financing is available. Thus periods with access to capital markets should 
show an increase in the procyclicality through this channel.   
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FISCAL FEDERALISM AND PROCYCLICAL SPENDING … 157 
III. Fiscal Federalism specificities: Argentina and Brazil 
There are many extensive descriptions of the specific fiscal federalism 
arrangements in Argentina and in Brazil.15 Thus we provide the minimum 
sketches here and relate the reader to more detailed and comprehensive 
assessments.  
Argentina16 
Argentina is a federal republic with a presidential government and a 
bicameral legislature. In the Chamber of Deputies, representatives for 24 
provinces are chosen in closed party lists. While the Chamber supposedly 
elects deputies in proportion to their populations, the Argentine system over-
represents the participation of small provinces through a minimum number of 
five deputies per jurisdiction. The Senate is represented by three senators each, 
two from the first majority and a third from the second party. Provincial 
governments have ample powers to decide their own rules of governance as 
well as taxing and spending decisions, while municipalities report to the 
provincial governments. Tommasi (2002) argues that this system, where 
municipalities and deputies of each jurisdiction respond to the provincial 
executive, makes governors key players in the political equilibrium.  
Although the Argentine Constitution establishes substantial room for 
subnational taxation, in practice provinces have delegated to the national 
government the responsibility of raising a large share of their taxes. This 
revenue concentration contrasts with a spending decentralization process 
whereby the responsibility for key social functions is in provincial hands. For 
example, provinces have exclusive competence in primary and secondary 
education and in the provision of local public goods (most social expenditures 
in education, health, poverty programs, and housing).   
Given expenditure decentralization and tax centralization, a high degree of 
vertical fiscal imbalance did result. In 2000, for example, 56 percent of total 
resources received by the provinces came from nationally collected taxes, 
while only 44 percent was financed directly by provincial revenues.  Fifteen of 
                                                 
15 See for example, Núñez Miñana (1998), Fiel (2003), CEDI (1999) Gomez Sabaini and 
Gaggero (1997), Iaryczower et al (2002), Jones et al (1999),  Tomasi et al (2001) for Argentina 
and Ter-Minassian, T. (1997b) and Afonso and Mello (2000) for Brazil.  
16 This section draws heavily from section I.2 of Tommasi (2002). 
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the 24 provinces finance less than 30 percent of their spending with their own 
resources. 
Argentina addresses this large vertical fiscal imbalance through a complex 
system of intergovernmental transfers.  The most important component of this 
system is the tax-sharing agreement called “Coparticipación”, which refers to 
the process by which part of the taxes collected by the central government are 
reallocated to the provinces.  Over time, the system has tended to redistribute 
in favor of the most backward and low-density provinces.  
The last Coparticipation Law, sanctioned in 1988, established a set of 
sharing rules. According to this law, the Federal government would retain 42 
percent of the revenue from the shared taxes, while 57 percent would be 
distributed among the provinces, with 1 percent set aside “to finance 
unforeseen crises in the provinces”. The law also sets the percentages of 
“secondary” distribution, i.e., the share of the 57 percent going to each 
province.  It is important to stress that this law stipulates most of the transfers, 
thus reducing dramatically the scope for discretionary policies and 
redistribution. 
Unfortunately, several other laws regulating the distribution of specific 
taxes to finance predetermined activities have supplemented the basic 
Coparticipation Law. These include a series of “fiscal pacts”.  For example, in 
1992-1993 the national government was able to obtain a 15 percent reduction 
in the amount of tax resources to be shared with the provinces, in exchange for 
financing the deficits in the local pension systems which were transferred to 
the national budget. 
According to Cetrangolo and Jimenez (2003), during the nineties, as the 
economy recovered and tax collection increased different schemes were 
pursued by both provinces and the federal government in order to appropriate 
a larger share of these resources. For example, while VAT and income taxes 
increased 152 percent between 1991 and 1995, the federal government 
managed to keep coparticipation transfers constant while direct transfers 
increased by 122 percent.  
These various reforms introduced new types of transfers besides 
Coparticipation per se.  Additionally, a variety of specific channels earmarked 
the resources from some taxes to specific, often economically unrelated, 
spending.  This all came to be known as the “Fiscal labyrinth” due to the 
intricacies and complexity of the resulting system. Needless to say, in some 
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cases the direct transfers appeared to be determined by political considerations. 
Cetrangolo and Jimenez (2003), for example, show the distribution of 
discretionary funds between 1989 and 2001, favored politically protected 
provinces. For example the province of La Rioja, from where the President at 
the time had built his political career, received 26.5% of all transfers the 
province, with the closest province receiving less than 6%.  
The 1994 Constitutional reform stipulated that a new tax revenue-sharing 
agreement had to be decided and put in place by January 1st, 1997.  However, 
this constitutional mandate remains unfulfilled.  As a result new fiscal pacts 
were signed in 1999 and 2000. In these pacts the national government 
promised to the provinces some fixed-sum transfers and some minimum 
revenue guarantees, assuming the role of residual claimant.  These clauses 
were violated by the national government during the 2001 crisis, when 
faltering tax revenues did not allow the government even to fulfill the 
minimum guarantee. 
Further fiscal pacts were signed after exiting convertibility, and included a 
freeing from the fix transfer amount, an obligation for the federal government 
to coparticipate the financial transactions tax, debt restructuring, and, yet, 
again, a pledge from provinces to balance the budget.   
Within Argentina’s federal structure all levels of government are generally 
permitted to borrow both domestically and abroad. However, in many 
provinces, the provincial Constitution imposes some restrictions on the 
borrowing ability of the government. In some jurisdictions these restrictions 
are quite demanding, and in some cases there are restrictions on the level of 
indebtedness and on the uses of debt.17 Nevertheless, more often than not these 
restrictions are violated, and in many provinces they are too loose to be 
binding (Braun and Tommasi, 2002). It is therefore not surprising then to find 
that borrowing limits have little effect on the fiscal behavior of provinces 
(Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi 1999).18  
                                                 
17 Cetrangolo and Jiménez (2003) provide a careful review of subnational fiscal rules.   
18 One way in which these limits became non-binding was through the use of provincial state 
banks that in most provinces were politically dependent on the provincial executive power, and, 
in practice, acted as captive sources of financing for subnational governments. Given their 
portfolio of bad assets (resulting to a significant extent from lending to provincial governments) 
many provincial banks were privatized in the aftermath of the 1995 Tequila crisis that had 
induced a run against, mainly, provincial financial institutions. However, some provincial banks 
were kept in government hands. Not surprisingly, the bank run of 2001 was again strongly 
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Provincial debt placements are subject to ex ante federal government 
controls, but seldom have the central government aborted a provincial issue. 
(Dillinger and Webb, 1999).  In recent years the main borrowing control 
mechanism centered on the arrangements that the provinces made to 
collateralize their debt, by pledging coparticipación resources as collateral.  
As tax sharing proceeds are distributed by the Banco de la Nación, provinces 
with a weak credit position grant an irrevocable order for Banco de la Nación 
to deduct the debt-service payments up-front from their coparticipación 
resources.  To get an idea of the extent to which this mechanism was used, it is 
worth noting that the percentage of tax revenues withheld for this purpose in 
2000 ran from 2 percent in Buenos Aires and La Pampa, to 85 percent in 
Tucumán, 92 percent in Jujuy, and 97 percent in Rio Negro.   
During 2001 and 2002, there was a large increase in the emission of 
provincial bonds in the form of quasi-money, to pay wages and other inputs 
with the stock quickly increasing to about  a third of monetary base at the time.  
This operation was started by several provinces, most notably Buenos Aires, 
and it was followed by a similar attempt of the national government who, in 
order to comply with the requirements of the various fiscal pacts started 
issuing a “federal”  bond (LECOP) of national circulation. Because it was used 
as money, it had a direct impact on the demand for pesos fuelling the run on 
the peso that eventually led to the collapse of convertibility. 
 
Brazil 
Brazil has an extremely complex federation. The three government levels 
comprise the Union, 26 states plus the Federal District, and more than 5500 
municipalities. The Constitution explicitly considers municipalities to be 
members of the federation, giving them a much higher status than is generally 
observed in other federative countries.   
The republic has a presidential regime and a bicameral legislature. Each 
state is equally represented in the upper chamber by three senators. 
Representation in the Chamber of Deputies is not strictly proportional to state 
                                                                                                                     
fuelled by a run on the largest two public banks: the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco 
Provincia that once again obtained large bailouts from the national government.  
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constituencies, as the Constitution establishes that no state may have less than 
8 deputies and more than 70. A constraint that basically leads to an over-
representation of the unpopulated Northern states and a marked under-
representation of the state of São Paulo. 
The fiscal federalism arrangement has undergone great changes over the 
country’s history. There has been alternating phases of decentralization and 
recentralization. During most of the 19th Century, when the country had a 
parliamentary monarchy, a high degree of centralization prevailed. The 
Proclamation of Republic, in 1889, would bring extensive devolution of taxes 
and spending to the states. But the central government was strengthened again 
during the authoritarian Vargas regime, in the 1930-1945 period. Re-
democratization brought a new decentralization wave, which would be 
reversed yet again from 1964 on, this time by 20 years of military government. 
The end of the military regime in 1985 opened room for still another diastolic 
movement. The interests of subnational governments dominated the redesign 
of the fiscal federalism arrangement established by the 1988 Constitution. 
Though the Constitution was very unclear in the assignment of 
expenditures to the three government levels, leaving ample room for 
concurrent responsibilities, it was quite clear in what concerns revenue 
assignment. Subnational governments, municipalities in particular, were 
directly or indirectly given a much more generous share of the aggregate taxes 
collected in the country. Though states and municipalities had their taxing 
power enhanced, much of the redistribution involved intergovernmental 
transfers based on clear cut revenue-sharing rules established in the 
constitution.  
Drafted without minimum consistency guidelines, that a politically crippled 
executive branch was unable to defend, the new constitution failed to endow 
the public sector with a coherent mechanism to protect the interests of the 
majority of the population against the multiple pressures of an emerging mass 
democracy. Instead, it amplified the scope for the historical widespread rent-
seeking behavior of many segments of the Brazilian society, imposing upon 
the federal budget a considerable additional burden, exactly when the Union’s 
fiscal resources were being reduced in favor of state and local governments, in 
the wake of a newly introduced but basically inconsistent fiscal federalism. 
As the new tax system designed in 1988 was phased in during the early 
nineties, the central government faced growing financial difficulties. But it 
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soon started an unrelenting reaction to avoid the scissors movement of 
shrinking revenues and swelling expenditures that had been imposed on the 
Union by new Constitution. As expected, increasing revenues proved to be 
much easier than cutting back expenditures, especially when a large part of the 
federal spending could not be reduced unless politically costly constitutional 
amendments were approved by Congress.   
Actually, the Union’s consistent effort to increase its tax revenue – in order 
to recover what had been lost to state and local governments, to be able to 
properly finance its much enlarged spending responsibilities as well as to 
attain a sizable fiscal-adjustment effort – would prove to be a tremendous 
success, were it not for a big problem. As the central government devised 
every kind of exotic taxation scheme that could raise revenues and that would 
not be shared with lower-level governments, this required introducing very 
low-quality taxes. Most often that meant various forms of cascading turnover 
taxes, that seemed to have been definitely eliminated from the Brazilian tax 
system since the mid sixties. 
Brazil has a gross tax burden of more than 36 percent, unusually high for a 
developing country. In 2002, roughly 70 percent of the tax burden was 
imposed by the Union. As the states’ own revenue corresponded to slightly 
more than 25 percent, municipalities were left with a share of less than 5 
percent of the total tax collection. However, when constitutional transfers are 
taken into account, the distribution of the aggregate tax revenue across 
jurisdictions changes dramatically. After all constitutionally-mandated 
transfers were made in 2002, the Union ended up with only 60 percent of the 
aggregate tax proceeds. The states remained with roughly 25 percent, as 
constitutional transfers from the federal level were practically offset by their 
own transfers to municipalities. The great net beneficiary of the redistribution 
was the local-government level. As a result of constitutional transfers from 
federal and state governments, municipalities could count on total revenue 
which was equivalent to almost 15 percent of the country’s aggregate tax 
collection. In other words, local governments were able to have access to an 
amount of resources that roughly tripled their own revenue.19  
Of course those aggregate shares conceal wide differences, at both the state 
and the local level. Although state-level governments as a whole are only 
being slightly benefited by constitutional transfers, individual states, the 
                                                 
19 See Secretaria da Receita Federal, Carga Tributária do Brasil, 2002, abril 2003. 
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poorest ones in particular, have obtained a sizable net gain from the 
redistribution. One should also note that gains from transfers on the local-
government level vary widely among the extensive spectrum of thousands of 
extremely differentiated municipalities. That spectrum includes at one end, the 
cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and at the other, all sorts of very poor 
small towns, with no own revenue, completely dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers. Revenue-sharing rules of federal- and state-level 
taxes embody a high degree of discrimination in favor of needier subnational 
governments.  
More than three fourths of all federal transfers to subnational governments 
are constitutionally-mandated transfers. Mostly stemming from the revenue-
sharing of the income tax and the IPI (the tax on industrialized products), 
collected at the federal level. Transfers from states to municipalities are also 
dominated by sheer compliance to revenue-sharing rules. Particularly 
important are the rules governing the sharing of the ICMS, the state-level 
value-added tax, which is the highest yielding source of revenue in the 
country. Discretionary, politically motivated grants have become much less 
important than in the past. 
The broad fiscal-adjustment effort that took place since the late nineties, in 
order to provide a sound basis for macroeconomic stability, required drastic 
changes in the fiscal-federalism arrangement, in order to impose hard budget 
constraints on subnational governments. The changes involved privatization of 
most banks owned by state governments and strict control on state borrowing. 
State debts were consolidated, transformed into debts to the Union and 
rescheduled for 20 to 30 years.20 Each state signed a separate agreement, in 
which its own revenue was offered in guarantee, and an explicit commitment 
to a detailed fiscal-adjustment program was made. The rescheduling created 
proper political conditions for the approval by Congress of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law that set up the institutional framework of a new fiscal 
regime.  
The new legislation imposed several important constraints on subnational 
governments. Payroll outlays were limited to 60 percent of the net current 
revenue, and debts were capped to a percentage of tax revenues, established by 
the Senate. Upon request of the Federal Executive Branch, limits can be 
altered, but only in special circumstances. Currently, the debt stock, as a 
                                                 
20 For details, see Bevilaqua (2000)  
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proportion of the net current revenue, is limited to 200 percent, in the case of 
the states, and to 120 percent, in the case of municipalities. Multi-year 
budgets, including explicit macroeconomic assumptions and contrasting 
scenarios are required from all government levels. Budget limits have to be 
strictly respected. A fiscal crime legislation establishes penalties for 
mismanagement. Noncompliance exposes incumbent governors and mayors to 
fines, loss of office, legal prosecution and re-election ban. Election-year 
provisions forbid borrowing based on anticipation of future revenue, 
expenditure without proper funding, and a ban on new hiring for 180 days 
before the election date. Emergency cash transfers among different 
government levels and any refinancing of debts are rigidly prohibited. In order 
to assure greater transparency in management of public accounts, the law 
imposes detailed book-keeping requirements to all government levels.21 
Approved in May 2000, the Fiscal Responsibility Law has proved to be an 
important advancement in the evolution towards a rules-based fiscal-policy, in 
a country with such a complex fiscal federalism arrangement as Brazil.22
IV. The evidence: procyclicality of spending of subnational governments 
in Argentina and Brazil 
Having reviewed the conceptual discussion and the institutional 
background of our analysis, we now tackle the question of discussing how the 
degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy has been affected by the behavior of 
subnational governments in the cases of Argentina and Brazil.  
a. Argentina 
As discussed in Section II, economic theory recommends that fiscal policy 
be countercyclical, i.e. that government surpluses increase during expansions 
and decrease during contractions23. In order to assess to what extent this has 
                                                 
21 For further details, see Goldfajn and Guardia (2003). 
22 For misgivings about the Fiscal Responsibility Law and the defense of still more powerful 
institutions to assure sound fiscal policy in Brazil, see Wyplosz (2003).  
23 Kaminsky Reinhart and Vegh (2004) define procyclicality in terms of policies: government 
expenditures and tax rates. Here we prefer to stick to outcomes: expenditure, total revenues and 
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been the case we begin by looking at the aggregate fiscal results available for 
Argentina from a long run perspective. In order to do so we look at a very 
simple relationship,  
ttt gSurplus εβα ++=∆ , 
where the variable ∆Surplus represents the change in the overall fiscal balance 
(income minus expenditures) of the federal government between year  t and t-1 
in percentage points of GDP. The variable gt represents the growth rate of the 
economy in year t. This simple relation cannot be interpreted as more than 
estimating the correlation between fiscal results and growth. Table 1, shows 
the results since the beginning of the 20th century.24
The results show, that there is very little relationship between fiscal 
balances and output and, somewhat surprisingly, the 90s show statistically 
significant evidence in favor of some countercyclical behavior of the fiscal 
result. Thus, the 90s show an improvement in the management in fiscal policy, 
at least relative to previous decades. This may be due to the fact that the 1988 
Coparticipation law restricted substantially the degree of discretionary 
transfers as explained is section II as carefully explained in Núñez Miñana 
(1998). However, the results are very small, indicating that a 1% increase in 
output growth leads to an improvement of the fiscal result of .09% of GDP.   
These results however are subject to important endogeneity concerns, and 
can only provide a general overview. Table 2 focuses on the period since 1990, 
and disaggregates revenues and spending expanding Table 7 in Gavin et al 
(1996) by showing the procyclicality of the overall fiscal balance, spending 
and revenues for the federal government, for subnational governments and for 
large and small subnational governments.25  
The methodology looks again at a simple correlation between output and 
the fiscal variables, except that they include fixed effects by jurisdiction in all 
the regression that pools information from different provinces. The 
specification, is simply, 
 
                                                                                                                     
fiscal surpluses. While these are endogenous variables, policy functions are adjusted to deliver a 
value for these variables.  
24 Data has been taken from Gerchunoff and Llach (2003). 
25 This work was possible because researchers at CEPAL generously provided the provincial 
GDP data.  
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ttt gSurplus εβα ++=∆  
ttt gvenues εβα ++=∆Re  
ttt gesExpenditur εβα ++=∆  
where ∆Revenues and ∆Expenditures, refer to the rate of change in each of 
those two variables and ∆Surplus to the change in the fiscal result as a 
percentage of local GDP. The coefficients should be interpreted as how much 
fiscal balances, revenues and expenditures, change in response to a 1% change 
in GDP, though because of the fixed effect these coefficients should be 
interpreted as “within” each jurisdiction. What is new in our analysis is that 
the interpretation of gt may vary as we run these regressions not only relating 
the fiscal variables to national output, as has been standard, but also to 
provincial output. It is surprising that this second exercise has not been 
implemented before as an evaluation of the procyclicality of the fiscal policy 
of subnational governments should consider how resources smooth the local 
business cycle, not the national cycle.26 We also run a series of IV regressions 
to correct for the endogeneity of the right hand side variable (output) to the 
dependent variable (fiscal policy). We instrument using the international 
interest rate, world growth and Argentina’s terms of trade.  
Table 2 and Figure 3 show the results computed from the time series for 
each aggregate. As the correlation is computed as the coefficient of a simple 
regression, the table indicates the statistical significance of the coefficient.27 
The numbers show at the federal level some evidence of a countercyclical 
fiscal policy. Both tax revenues and expenditures appear to be much more 
procyclical than in either OECD or Latin America countries, but all in all, this 
delivers a fiscal policy that appears to be countercyclical in about the same 
range as in the OECD. Figure 3 shows the scatter plot with the results. 
This pattern differs when considering the provinces. There we see an 
equally highly procyclical income and revenues relative to national output, 
however while the national government had an overall fiscal policy that was 
countercyclical, fiscal results for subnational governments show a procyclical 
result, ie. the surplus falls when output increases. Consistent with conventional 
                                                 
26 Piffano et al (1998) provide the most careful analysis of prociclicality to date, but the analysis 
is squarely focused on the relation with national output.  
27 A *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
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wisdom, small provinces appear to be much more procyclical than larger 
provinces, particularly on the spending side. All results are virtually 
unchanged when IV estimation is used.  
However, when looking at the relation between revenues, spending and 
local output, a far more important measure of procyclicality, the numbers are 
much smaller, particularly for small provinces, and because the link weakens 
mostly for revenues this increases the procyclicality of fiscal variables. Here 
the IV estimates deliver a different result, increasing the procyclicality of 
revenues significantly, and leading to an overall acyclical policy. This is an 
important result that modifies a fair amount of conventional wisdom in this 
area: once only exogenous changes in output are considered, fiscal policy of 
subnational jurisdictions become acyclical, rather than procyclical. At any rate, 
the conclusion is that small provinces are more procyclical than larger 
provinces, and exhibit a procyclical or acyclical fiscal policy depending on the 
estimation technique.  
Next we address the issue of the sources of procyclicality of provincial 
revenues by looking at the components that add up to total tax collection.  
Table 3 shows the results. As can be seen from the table, revenues are strongly 
procyclical. However when dividing the sources of revenues in taxes and 
transfers from the central government (as well as the total of resources that are 
not transfers) we find that the tax component is uniformly more procyclical 
than the resources obtained from national sources. Among the taxes it is 
ingresos brutos, a cascading sales tax, the one with the highest degree of 
procyclicality while property taxes, as expected have very little relation with 
the business cycle.28 This suggests that the procyclicality of provincial 
governments may not be explained by the specifics of the current transfer 
scheme between the national government and the provinces.   
However, these measures of procyclicality are computed by looking at the 
rate of change of each revenue source and how it relates to changes in local or 
national output. But which is more important as a source of procyclicality? 
This requires taking into account the relative size of each component. To do 
this we look at how the change in the sources of income in terms of local GDP 
relates to the local and national business cycle. By referencing to GDP we can 
obtain a measure of the quantitative importance of each source. The results are 
                                                 
28 Some provinces have transferred part of the property tax to local governments, thus reducing 
the degree or cyclicality of that income source.  
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presented in Table 4 which shows again that most income sources are 
procyclical. For the provinces as a whole both sources, national and local 
resources are roughly equally important as source of procyclicality. However 
the relative importance for each jurisdiction depends on the size of the 
province. For large provinces, taxes collected at the level of the jurisdiction are 
more important as sources of procyclicality. For small provinces, national 
transfers are the key drivers of procyclicality. This, of course, mimicks the 
relative importance of revenue sources in a context in which all sources are 
procyclical.   
The role of local taxation in the Argentina federal system had already been 
stressed in pioneering work by Horacio Núñez Miñana almost thiry years ago 
(see Núñez Miñana, 1974) who had already identified the (growing) 
importance of local resources in the analysis of fiscal federalism and in 
explaining its procyclicality.29 More recently Piffano et al (1998) also studied 
the cyclical properties of local taxes, and while they show that local revenues 
magnified the procyclicality of total resources they fell short of quantifying the 
point that we believe is one of the main conclusions of this work (particularly 
considering the amount of energy that has associated the “coparticipation” 
regime as the sole source of the procyclicality of government resources), that 
transfers and local sources of revenues are equally responsible for the 
procyclicality of local revenues.  
Testing the sources of procyclicality 
So far we have shown that government expenditure shows differing degree 
of procyclicality across jurisdictions. If the objective is to reduce the degree of 
procyclicality when present, it is necessary to understand why this 
procyclicality occurs. In cross country analysis, the literature has addressed 
this issue by relating the procyclicality of government expenditure, for 
example, to a number of economy characteristics. 30
In this section we take a similar approach, but concentrating our focus on 
the subnational entities. In particular, we ask ourselves about the determinants 
of procyclicality for subnational entities in Argentina. In particular we want to 
test to what extent the theories discussed above can explain the cross 
                                                 
29 See also Núñez Miñana and Porto (1980, 1982).  
30 See for example Lane (2002) and Stein et al (1999).   
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jurisdiction variability in procyclicality. Similar exercises for a cross section of 
countries include Stein et al (1999), Lane (2003) and by Talvi and Vegh 
(2000) among others.  
For the case of subnational governments we could refer to the three 
channels by which spending becomes procyclical discussed in section II. One 
is the effect of changes in market access for the subnational governments that 
argues that procyclicality arises from the fact that jurisdictions may get cut off 
from financial markets during downturns. Empirically this suggests relating 
the degree of cyclicality to the stock of provincial debt, as well as to the size of 
the economy (under the weak assumption that larger jurisdictions are more 
likely to access credit). The fiscal voracity argument points out that 
procyclicality arises from the fact that governments are subject to larger 
pressures for fiscal resources during booms. This suggests relating the 
procyclicality of public expenditure to the procyclicality of fiscal revenues. 
Similarly, one could argue that a jurisdiction that receives a larger share of 
resources from the federal government is more likely to be subject to fiscal 
pressures, and therefore more likely to exhibit procyclicality. Finally, there is 
the possibility that provinces prey the federal government. In this case 
procyclicality arises because provinces seek national resources when the 
federal government has more resources or easier access to credit. Thus market 
access of the national government is relevant, enticing subnational 
jurisdictions to predate those resources. Predation of fiscal resources can also 
occur by engineering a crisis that forces a bailout from the national level. In 
this regard, size may imply a greater likelihood of a bailout, as the national 
government may perceive large jurisdictions as “too big to fail” (on the other 
hand it may be easier to bail out a smaller jurisdiction, and the incentives to do 
so may be there if they are overrepresented in the political system). 
Coincidence of the presidential party with that of the governor also may work 
in the same direction.31
Table 5 summarizes the different hypothesis and their implications on the 
expected degree of procyclicality. To start analyzing this issue Table 6 looks at 
the procyclicality of the three variables, expenditure, revenue and fiscal 
balances, by province. Again the procyclicality is measured relative both to 
national output and to each province`s GDP and computed with OLS. The 
table shows that there is substantial volatility in behavior. For example during 
                                                 
31 As long as the two are not political rivals. 
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the 90s, the procyclicality of government expenditures ranged from a low of .3 
for Neuquén to a high of 1.9 for the Province of Buenos Aires relative to 
national output (almost 3 relative to local output in Corrientes!). Both 
government expenditure and revenues correlate more strongly with local 
output than with national output, the difference being stronger on the revenue 
side.   
Table 7 shows the results of relating the coefficient of procyclicality of 
expenditures to the variables that may explain this behavior at the provincial 
level. Provincial debt is considered in 2001, as reliable data for that year can 
be obtained from Cetrangolo and Jimenez (2003). Size is measured as 
provincial output as a percentage of national GDP also considered in 2001. 
The procyclicality of revenues is taken from Table 6, and captures the 
response of revenues to output changes. The share of resources obtained from 
transfers is taken as the average for the period.  The presidential party dummy 
adds the number of years in which the party of the president coincided with 
that of the governor during the time period. We also include a dummy for oil 
producing provinces which have an alternative, mostly exogenous, source of 
revenue.  
As can be seen (either when the coefficients are obtained when relating to 
national output or to local output) all variables are non significant with the 
exception of the procyclicality of the revenues that appears with the expected 
positive sign. The higher the degree of procyclicality of own resources the 
higher the degree of procyclicality of government expenditures. In all the 
results seem to provide fairly strong evidence in favor of a procyclicality that 
comes from very procyclical revenues at the provincial level, with little impact 
from other interpretations, such as the credit channel and the possibility of 
predation of national resources.  
b. Brazil 
Due to the lack of data by jurisdiction, the analysis of the degree of 
procyclicality of the spending of subnational governments in Brazil will not be 
made along the same lines that were followed in the case of Argentina. 
However, the different approach provides a complementary analysis.  
There is now a good consistent data set, with monthly series of aggregate 
fiscal variables for state and municipalities in Brazil. But the series are 
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somewhat short as they start in January 1997.32 However, it could be argued 
that there is no point in being too worried about detecting fiscal-policy 
procyclicality during the eighties and early nineties. Under the fiscal regime 
that prevailed in Brazil over that period, there were all kinds of reasons for the 
existence of a high degree of procyclicality. A much more interesting question 
is to detect to what extent procyclicality has subsisted the drastic change of 
fiscal regime observed since the late nineties in Brazil. From that perspective, 
the relevant period is exactly the most recent one, for which data is available. 
Unfortunately, the mentioned data set does not include a series of aggregate 
primary expenditures of subnational governments. But it does include receipts 
of the three most important state taxes, comprising more than 90% of the of 
total tax revenue collected at the state level. It also includes data on federal 
transfers to subnational governments and on the aggregate primary balance of 
states and municipalities. Based on the available data, an acceptable estimate 
of the aggregate primary expenditures of state and municipalities was 
constructed as: revenue from the three most important state-level taxes + 
federal transfers to states and municipalities - aggregate primary balance of 
states and municipalities. 
As less important state-level taxes and taxes directly collected by 
municipalities are not taken into account, the true value of the aggregate 
primary expenditures of state and municipalities would surely be 
underestimated. However, the discrepancy would be relatively small 
(approximately 14% in 2002, which is acceptable, since it is the cyclical 
behavior of the variable that will be under analysis). 
As a reliable seasonally-adjusted real GDP index is only available on a 
quarterly basis, a real seasonally-adjusted quarterly series of the estimate was 
generated.33 A Hodrick-Prescott filter was then used to obtain the cyclical 
components of both series, in order to analyze the degree of procyclicality.34 A 
regression between these two components provides a measure of 
procyclicality. This and similar results for other fiscal variables are shown in 
                                                 
32 The data is available in www.ipeadata.gov.br. 
33 The series were deflated by the IPCA, a consumer price index. 
34 In order to obtain the cyclical components, the HP filter was applied to the logarithms of both 
series. Braun and Gresia (2003) used the same procedure to study the degree of procyclicality 
of social expenditures in Latin America.  
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Table 8 and Figure 4.  As in the case of Argentina the results suggest a 
substantial degree of procyclicality of primary expenditures.  
As there are only 28 observations, one has to be very careful about drawing 
conclusions about procyclicality. But, having that in mind, we may attempt to 
get further insights, asking several interesting questions that mimick those 
asked for Argentina. What are the main factors behind the detected 
procyclicality of the primary expenditures of subnational governments in 
Brazil? To what extent may it be attributed to the cyclical behavior of federal 
transfers? To what degree does it stem from the procyclicality of the tax 
revenue directly collected by subnational governments? What has been the 
effect of the primary balance? 
First of all, it seems clear that the procyclicality of the primary expenditures 
of subnational governments simply reflects the highly procyclical behavior of 
their revenue (see Table 8 and Figure 4). Taking as an estimate of that revenue 
the sum of the receipts of the three most important state-level taxes plus 
federal transfers to states and municipalities, one also finds a large level of 
procyclicality, though slightly smaller than for expenditures.   
Notice that this equation has a much higher R-squared than the previous 
one. Thus there seems to be grounds to affirm that the aggregate primary 
balance has been contributing to avoid that the high degree of synchronization 
that has been observed between the cyclical movements of the aggregate 
revenue and the GDP shows up with the same intensity in the relation between 
the cyclical components of the aggregate expenditures and the GDP. A quite 
interesting result, that has to do with new fiscal regime that has been imposed 
on subnational governments in Brazil since the late nineties. 
The main source of the procyclicality appears to be the behavior of the tax 
revenue directly collected by subnational governments. In fact, the strong 
procyclicality of the revenue from the three most important state-level taxes is 
also shown in Table 8 and Figure 4. 
One may also say that the procyclical behavior of the revenue from the 
three most important state-level taxes stems in turn from the high 
procyclicality of the ICMS revenue. The ICMS, a value added tax, is by far the 
most important state tax, and as shown in Table 8 and Figure 4 it is also 
procyclical.   
 But it is important to note that, though the procyclicality of the revenue 
from the three most important state-level taxes seems to be dominated by the 
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procyclical behavior of the ICMS, the combined revenue of the other two state 
taxes also show some procyclicality. Those taxes are the IPVA (imposed on 
motor-vehicles) and the property-transfer tax.  
What about the cyclical behavior of the federal transfers? The results in 
Table 8 and figure 4 suggest that it is hard to conclude that total federal 
transfers have been procyclical over the period. In fact even if only 
constitutional transfers are taken into consideration, no procyclical pattern 
seems to emerge either. Constitutional transfers are by far the most important 
part of the total federal transfers. The revenue-sharing arrangement established 
by the Constitution is mainly based on two taxes collected by the federal 
government. One of them is the income tax, which in Brazil includes both a 
personal income tax and a profit-tax imposed on firms. The other is the IPI, a 
tax on industrialized products. The federal government is supposed to transfer 
to states and municipalities 47% of the income tax revenue and 57% of the IPI 
revenue. In spite of the fact that the IPI revenue has proved to be highly 
procyclical, as confirmed in Table 8, the cyclical behavior of constitutional 
transfers seems to have been dominated by the evolution of the income tax 
revenue that, at first sight, has shown no evidence of procyclicality over the 
period. 
As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to make sense of this seemingly erratic 
behavior. The spike in 1999:1, for example, is explained by the effects of the 
sharp exchange-rate devaluation on the income tax collected on capital gains. 
The other spike in 2002 is due to a sudden large payment of income tax in 
arrears by major pension funds, in the wake of a long judicial fight. If such 
explanations were taken into account and the effects of those outlying points 
eliminated, one may get some evidence of procyclicality in the behavior of 
constitutional transfers, but if the current pattern remains one should expect 
the tax to remain mostly unrelated to business fluctuations.  
The analysis conducted above, to determine to what extent subnational 
governments have been a source of fiscal-policy procyclicality in Brazil, was 
all based on aggregate fiscal variables, where states and municipalities were 
taken as a whole. It goes without saying that it would be interesting if the same 
kind of analysis could be replicated for each individual state. Unfortunately 
that is not possible as there are no reliable reasonably frequent state-level 
fiscal data to work with. Though the aggregate value of the primary balance of 
state and municipal governments has been published monthly by the Central 
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Bank for quite some time, state government do not allow the Bank to disclose 
each individual state’s primary balance. For the most recent period, since 
2001, after the Fiscal Responsibility Law, there is good non-annual data 
available. However the series are irremediably short.  
At any rate the picture that emerges from the analysis of the Brazilian 
evidence seems to be quite clear and fairly consistent with that of Argentina. 
The available fiscal data seems to indicate that the spending of subnational 
governments, at the state-level in particular, has shown a marked degree of 
procyclicality. But the main reasons behind the procyclical pattern are not to 
be found in the behavior of federal transfers. They clearly stem from the tax 
revenues directly collected by subnational governments, especially from the 
ICMS, the main state-level tax. 
V. Conclusions  
Having analyzed to what extent subnational governments have been a 
source of fiscal-policy procyclicality in both Argentina and Brazil, we are able 
to draw some interesting conclusions. Despite all the differences in the 
specificities of the fiscal-federalism arrangements of the two countries, the 
evidence that stems from our analysis suggests that there are important 
common features in how subnational governments have been affecting fiscal-
policy procyclicality in Argentina and Brazil. 
We have found that the spending of subnational governments has been 
markedly procyclical in both countries. But quite contrary to what seems to be 
a widespread belief, the observed procyclicality cannot be attributed, or at least 
cannot be solely attributed, to the behavior of federal transfers. In both 
countries, though more so in Brazil than in Argentina, the main source of 
procyclicality is to be found in the highly procyclical pattern of tax revenues 
directly collected by subnational governments. So it is not the flow of federal 
transfers that makes the spending of subnational governments procyclical but 
their tax structures. 
It should be mentioned that, in the case of Brazil, the sharp change in the 
fiscal regime that took place since the end of 1998 has implied some 
dampening of the procyclicality of the primary spending of subnational 
governments, as the states and large municipalities have been finally put under 
a hard budget constraint, and forced to generate a reasonably sizable primary 
surplus to service their rescheduled debt to the Union. 
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These results have an important implication. In order to reduce the 
procyclicality of the expenditures of either, Argentine provinces or Brazilian 
states, one should focus, not on redesigning rules and practices of 
intergovernmental transfers, but on creating better insitutions that reduce the 
degree by which this very procyclical tax base becomes government 
expenditure. No small task, in both countries. 
Countercyclical measures to smooth de facto the resources collected by 
subnational governments could also be considered. Unfortunately, many 
attempts to build these countercyclical measures are enshrined in the law but 
have very little impact on real policies. The design of fiscal rules that work is a 
complex matter, particularly in societies subject to large instability. To 
illustrate how complex the anticipation of the effects of a particular fiscal 
design may be, just consider the following remarks from the World Bank 
study, Beyond the Center, Decentralizing the State issued in 1999 (Burki et al, 
1999). This study referred to the experiences of Argentina and Brazil in the 
following way: 
 
“Argentina: the successful institutionalization of a hard budget 
constraint on provinces. 
 
Fiscal deficits at the federal level were a major problem in Argentina 
before 1991, leading to hyperinflation, which reached over 5,000 
percent in 1989. Provincial deficits and indirect bailouts of provincial 
banks, which had access to central bank credit, contributed to the 
financial difficulties of the period. Provinces accounted for at least half 
of the public sector deficits that fueled the hyperinflation. 
 In addition to major improvements at the national level - committing 
legally to currency convertibility at a fixed rate with the dollar (the 
Convertibility Law), cutting the budget deficit, and privatizing major 
industries - the steps to improve subnational finances in the 1990s 
were also important for the success of macroeconomic stabilization. 
 The strong anti-inflation commitment after 1991 and tight limits on 
central bank credit to the public sector in Argentina limited 
subnational spending and deficits in two ways. First, it allowed the 
federal government to reject provincial pleas for more resources after 
the Tequila shock, with the rationale that it could not increase 
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transfers without endangering the stabilization gains and the survival 
of the Currency Board system. Second, it constrained the ability of the 
provinces to borrow from their own banks by tightening bank 
regulations and eliminating local government access to the central 
bank rediscount facility. After the 1994-95 economic shock, most 
provinces had to recapitalize or privatize their banks - borrowing from 
them was not an option. Eighteen of the provincial banks were 
privatized during 1994-96 and more have gone through the process 
since then (World Bank 1998). 
 The timing had been good. Making changes before the crisis had 
forced the provinces to adjust turned out to be of critical importance 
for the institutionalization of the hard budget constraint in subnational 
finances in Argentina. 
 
 
Brazil: Repeated rescheduling. No hard budget constraint for the 
states.   
 A state debt crisis was not the main macroeconomic problem that 
observers expected from decentralization in Brazil. 
They feared that the large increase in tax sharing mandated by the 
1988 constitution would provoke federal deficits, because the federal 
government would not cut its ordinary (non-transfer) expenditures or 
raise federal taxes by an equivalent amount. 
 Nevertheless, fiscal adjustment ultimately occurred at the federal 
level. 
 The main macroeconomic problem with decentralization, however, 
arose from excessive state deficits and then mismanagement of the 
debt. 
 In the earlier debt crises, the debt agreements established three 
precedents that influenced subsequent agreements. First, the federal 
government actually put the state debt on its books and then provided 
relief in the form of rescheduling, rather than forgiveness. Second, 
through the combination of grace periods, rescheduling, and debt 
service caps, the agreements reduce the debt service burden of sitting 
administrations, leaving the fiscal consequences to their successors. 
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 The repeated cycle of the federal government refinancing state debt, 
coupled with caps on debt service, had the perverse incentive effects 
that one would expect. By the time some consensus for action had been 
reached, the number of bankrupt states was too large to allow them all 
to fail, and their debt had grown too large for any solution without 
substantial debt relief to work. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazilian subnational debt as a share 
of GDP was at a level similar to Argentina's, but by 1997 it had more 
than doubled. Unfortunately, the Brazilian stabilization program of 
1994, the most successful to date, left unchanged many rules and 
institutions, which motivated the states to let their debt grow. Most of 
this debt was owed to the central government or to state banks, and 
until the debt-rescheduling agreements in 1998, much of it was not 
being serviced by the states. Interest was being capitalized. As a result, 
state debt and deficits were a direct fiscal problem for the central 
government and for the overall public sector.” 
 
As the reader may have anticipated, only a few years later, however, Argentina 
was in the midst of a large fiscal crisis mostly triggered by irresponsible 
behavior at the provincial level (the federal government had engineered during 
that year an adjustment of about 4 percent of GDP, through a combination of 
spending cuts and tax hikes, while provinces increased their imbalances), 
while Brazil appeared to be consolidating its fiscal position, both at the federal 
and subnational level on the basis of stricter application of fiscal rules.  
When rules were expected to work they didn’t, where they were not expected 
to work they did. There are no clear cut recommendations to build working 
fiscal systems, but what is clear is that focusing on the wrong issue is not the 
way to start. This paper has shown that if procyclicality of fiscal policy is the 
concern, the solution should not be searched in a revamping of tax sharing 
rules but on developing better fiscal institutions within each jurisdiction.  
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Figure 1.a Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
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Figure 1b. Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
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Table 1. Procyclicality in the 20th Century: Argentina 
 
1914-2001 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
GDP Growth 0.049 0.114* 0.086 -0.051 0.136 -0.253* 0.164 0.325 -0.022 0.089*
(0.036) (0.053) (0.16) (0.077) (0.087) (0.115) (0.137) (0.304) (0.157) (0.05)
Constant -0.156 0.069 -0.678 -0.096 -0.645 0.536 -0.323 -1.256 0.085 -0.206
(0.206) (0.484) (1.019) (0.379) (0.529) (0.569) (0.844) (1.286) (0.74) (0.275)
Observations 88 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12
R-squared 0.02 0.53 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.37 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.25
Change in surplus
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Table 2. Cyclical Response of Fiscal Policy Argentina 1992-2002 
 
Revenues Expenditures Surplus Revenues Expenditures Surplus
OECD (1) 0.84 0.09 0.25 - - -
Latin America (1) 1.32 0.61 0.08 - - -
with GDP
Argentina 1.430 1.500 0.205 1.196 1.410 0.243
(0.293)*** (0.362)*** (0.073)** (0.373)** (0.447)** (0.091)**
Total Provinces 1.470 1.391 -0.056 1.479 1.276 -0.016
(0.091)*** (0.113)*** (0.028)* (0.112)*** (0.139)*** (0.04)
Big Provinces 1.832 0.53 0.023 1.851 0.062 0.013
(0.16)*** (0.43) (0.03) (0.229)*** (0.62) (0.04)
Small Provinces 1.389 1.332 -0.064 1.404 1.225 -0.019
(0.103)*** (0.127)*** (0.034)* (0.127)*** (0.157)*** (0.04)
with local PBG
Total Provinces 1.124 1.224 -0.085 2.011 1.577 0.063
(0.112)*** (0.123)*** (0.029)*** (0.202)*** (0.205)*** (0.06)
Big Provinces 1.792 0.813 -0.001 2.069 0.147 0.016
(0.199)*** (0.441)* (0.031) (0.316)*** (0.70) (0.05)
Small Provinces 1.000 1.127 -0.095 2.041 1.633 0.003
(0.126)*** (0.140)** (0.034)*** (0.258)*** (0.258)** (0.062)
OLS Instrumental Variables
 
(1) Taken from Gavin et al (1996). 
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Table 3. Procyclicality of Provincial Resources in Argentina 1992-2002 
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Table 4. Procyclicality of Provincial Resources Argentina 1992-2002 
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Table 5. Testing Procyclicality at the Subnational Level  
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Table 6. Procyclicality by Province in Argentina 1992-2002 
 
local national local national local national
Buenos Aires 1.974*** 1.885*** 2.298*** 2.255*** -0.029 -0.029
CBsAs 1.335** 1.463** 1.566*** 1.772*** 0.004 0.007
Catamarca 0.641 1.722*** 0.431 1.647*** -0.112 -0.132
Chaco 1.491* 1.543*** 1.364** 1.353*** -0.252 -0.178
Chubut 1.102** 1.180*** 0.012 0.036 -0.210* -0.222**
Cordoba 1.764** 1.788** 1.744*** 1.968*** -0.044 -0.026
Corrientes 2.904*** 1.693*** 1.950** 1.590*** -0.232* -0.06
Entre Ríos 1.853*** 1.477** 1.760*** 1.916*** -0.079 0.021
Formosa 2.338*** 1.339** 2.068*** 1.394*** -0.544 -0.215
Jujuy 0.366 0.726 0.519 1.033** -0.056 -0.011
La Pampa 1.598* 1.459* 1.164** 1.119*** -0.188 -0.155
La Rioja 1.699** 1.251** 1.733** 1.516*** -0.153 -0.048
Mendoza 1.437 1.796* 2.197* 2.440** 0.090 0.078
Misiones 1.683** 1.579** 1.789*** 1.728*** -0.033 -0.028
Nuequen 0.819 0.366 0.204 0.062 -0.171 -0.100
Río Negro 0.547 1.461* 1.034 1.362** 0.061 -0.087
Salta 0.64 1.521*** 0.179 1.706** -0.067 0.088
San Juan 1.798** 1.648** 1.832*** 1.863*** -0.085 -0.035
San Luis 0.899 0.714 1.242*** 1.131*** -0.01 0.016
Santa Cruz 0.763* 0.861* 0.54 0.796 -0.082 -0.08
Santa Fe 2.176*** 1.613*** 1.556*** 1.488*** -0.083 -0.022
Santiago del Estero 1.980*** 1.449*** 1.795*** 1.123*** -0.165 -0.166
Tierra del Fuego 1.089* 1.716** 0.943 2.531*** -0.089 0.011
Tucumán 0.668 1.126* 1.387*** 1.432*** 0.077 0.030
Average 0.752 0.602 0.483 0.298 -0.091 -0.049
Revenues Surplus/local gdpExpenditures
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Table 7. Sources of Procyclicality 
Expenditures Expenditures 
relative to local gdp relative to national gdp
Income Prociclycality 0.731*** 0.451***
(0.182) (0.098)
No. of years party pres = 
party gov
-0.015 -0.021
(0.029) (0.015)
Prov. PBG / GDP -0.006 0.015
(0.018) (0.010)
% from coparticipación 0.003 0.006
(0.008) (0.004)
Prov. Debt / PBG (2001) -0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.004)
Dummy - Oil Provinces -0.287 -0.080
(0.276) (0.151)
Constant 0.314 0.440
(0.452) (0.279)
Observations 24 24
R-squared 0.628 0.672
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Table 8. Correlation between output and fiscal variables of subnational 
governments in Brazil 
Coefficients R-squared
Primary Expenditures 2.555 0.40
(0.615)***
Revenue 2.174 0.59
(0.569)***
Tax Revenue Directly Collected 2.061 0.78
(0.476)***
Revenue from the ICMS 2.104 0.78
(0.484)***
Motor-vehicle and Property Taxes 2.262 0.18
(0.937)***
Federal Transfers 1.497 0.13
(1.061)
Constitutional Transfers 1.442 0.07
(0.968)
Revenue from the Tax on Industrialized Products 3.265 0.56
(0.854)***
Income Tax Revenue -1.161 0.03
(1.238)
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Figure 3. Cross plots of local output growth and fiscal variables in 
Argentina 
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Figure 4: Cross plots of output growth and fiscal variables in Brazil 
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FISCAL FEDERALISM AND PROCYCLICAL SPENDING: 
THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
 
FEDERICO STURZENEGGER  AND ROGÉRIO L. F. WERNECK 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Clasificación JEL: E6, H7 
Este trabajo estudia las Fuentes de la prociclicalidad del gasto para gobiernos 
subnacionales en Argentina y Brasil. Encontramos que los esquemas de 
coparticipación de los impuestos explican solo una parte menor de la 
prociclicalidad de los recursos de las entidades subnacionales, siendo la mayor 
parte explicada por la prociclicalidad de los propios recursos. Esto es 
especialmente visible cuando esa prociclicalidad se mide relativa al producto de 
cada entidad subnacional. Usando evidencia de corte transversal para distintas 
jurisdicciones podemos concluir que, a su vez, la prociclicalidad del gasto resulta 
de la prociclicalidad de los recursos, mediante el llamado “voracity effect”. La 
conclusión es que el debate sobre la prociclicalidad del gasto de entidades 
subnacionales debiera concentrarse mucho mas en mejorar los sistemas 
impositivos locales que en cambiar los regimenes de coparticipación. 
Palabras claves: prociclicalidad de los recursos y gasto publico, regímenes de 
coparticipación, fuentes de la prociclicalidad, Argentina, Brasil 
 
SUMMARY 
 
JEL Classification: E6, H7 
This paper studies the sources of procyclicality for the spending of subnational 
governments in Argentina and Brazil. We find that tax sharing schemes explain 
only a marginal share of the prociclicality of revenues, with most of the 
prociclicality coming from subnational government’s own resources. This is more 
so when the prociclicality of each source is measured vis a vis each jurisdiction’s 
output. Cross jurisdiction evidence supports the claim that procyclicality of 
spending results from the procyclicality of revenues, through the so called 
“voracity effect”. The conclusion is that the debate on prociclical subnational 
spending should focus on improving the tax collection schemes at the local level 
and not on reforming the tax sharing agreements. 
Keywords: procyclicality of government expenditures & resources, tax sharing 
schemes, sources of procyclicality, Argentina, Brazil. 
 
